Command and Control for Cyberspace Operations - A Call for Research by Morgan, Adam S & Stone, Steve W
Military Cyber Affairs 
Volume 4 
Issue 1 Command and Control of Cyberspace 
Operations 
Article 4 
2019 
Command and Control for Cyberspace Operations - A Call for 
Research 
Adam S. Morgan 
The MITRE Corporation, asmorgan@mitre.org 
Steve W. Stone 
The MITRE Corporation, sstone@mitre.org 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/mca 
Recommended Citation 
Morgan, Adam S. and Stone, Steve W. (2019) "Command and Control for Cyberspace Operations - A Call 
for Research," Military Cyber Affairs: Vol. 4 : Iss. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/mca/vol4/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Military Cyber Affairs by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact 
scholarcommons@usf.edu. 
Abstract 
The United States Department of Defense (DoD) declared cyberspace as an 
operational domain in 2011.  The DoD subsequently formed US Cyber Command 
and the Cyber Mission Force to conduct operations to achieve national and military 
objectives in and through cyberspace.  Since that time, the DoD has implemented 
and evolved through multiple command and control (C2) structures for cyberspace 
operations, derived from traditional military C2, to achieve unity of effort across 
the global cyberspace domain and with military operations in the physical domains 
(land, sea, air, and space).  The DoD continues to struggle to adapt its command 
and control (C2) methods from the physical domains to the cyber domain.  
Applying traditional military C2 constructs to the cyberspace domain leads to 
several problems due to the uniqueness of cyberspace from the other domains.  
Cyberspace presents a very different operational environment than the physical 
domains, where time and space are compressed.  
In this paper, we describe the factors that make cyberspace different from the other 
operational domains and the challenges those differences impose on existing C2 
constructs.  We propose a campaign of experimentation, consisting of a series 
Cyberspace C2 experiments, to address these challenges by conducting research 
into the taxonomy of C2 nodes, decisions, information, and relationships, which 
can be used to simulate and refine DoD Cyberspace Operations C2 constructs.
1
Morgan and Stone: Command and Control for Cyberspace Operations - A Call for Research
Published by Scholar Commons, 2019
 1. Introduction 
The environment in which the Department of Defense (DoD) operates has been 
changed by the rapid development and adoption of information technologies such 
as electronics, telecommunications infrastructures, and information systems1.  The 
adoption of these technologies has resulted in the environment known as 
cyberspace.  The DoD defines cyberspace as “A global domain within the 
information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information 
technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, 
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 
controllers.”2  Cyberspace has increased the amount of information that can be 
digitally sent anywhere, anytime to almost anyone. The increased access to 
information has affected human cognition, dramatically impacting human behavior, 
and decision-making.3 
The DoD declared cyberspace as an operational domain in 2011.  The DoD 
subsequently formed US Cyber Command and the Cyber Mission Force to conduct 
operations to achieve national and military objectives in and through cyberspace.  
The DoD defines cyberspace operations as “The employment of cyberspace 
capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through 
cyberspace.”4 
Since declaring cyberspace as an  operational domain, the DoD has implemented 
and evolved through multiple command and control (C2) structures for cyberspace 
operations, derived from traditional military C2 doctrine, to achieve unity of effort 
across the global cyberspace domain and with military operations in the physical 
domains (land, sea, air, and space).5 
The DoD defines command and control as, “The exercise of authority and direction 
by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the 
accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2.”6 Throughout history, the U.S. 
                                                          
1 Kuehl, D.T. 2009. “From cyberspace to cyberpower: Defining the problem,” in Cyberpower and 
national security, ed. Kramer, F. D., Wentz, L.K. & Starr, S. H. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc. 
2 U.S. Department of Defense. 2014. Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms. Retrieved from: 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf, 63. 
3 Kuehl, “From cyberspace to cyberpower: Defining the problem”. 
4 U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, 63. 
5 Pomerleau, M. February 28th, 2018. “Cyber Command granted new, expanded authorities” in 
The Fifth Domain. Retrieved from:  
https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/cybercom/2018/02/28/cyber-command-granted-new-and-
expanded-authorities/. And  Pomerleau, M. June 22nd, 2018. “DoD makes significant updates to 
cyber operations doctrine”, in The Fifth Domain.  Retrieved from: 
https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/2018/06/22/dod-makes-significant-updates-to-cyber-
operations-doctrine/. 
6 U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, 44. 
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military has been very effective conducting operations in the physical world and 
has developed a large body of command and control doctrine for operations in the 
physical domain.  Recently, in response to the changing environment for military 
operations, the DoD has begun development of new doctrine for multi-domain 
operations.  Multi-domain operations presents a new operational framework, “a 
cognitive tool to assist commanders to visualize and describe the application of 
combat power in time, space, and purpose.”7 across all domains (land, sea, air, 
space and cyberspace). 
However, the DoD continues to struggle to adapt its C2 methods from the physical 
domains (land, sea, air, and space) to the cyber domain.  Cyberspace presents a very 
different operational environment than the physical domains where time and space 
are compressed.8 In another definition of cyberspace, Daniel Kuehl states 
“cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment whose 
distinctive and unique character is framed by the use of electronics and the 
electromagnetic spectrum to create, store, modify, exchange, and exploit 
information via interdependent and interconnected networks using information-
communication technologies.”9  Applying traditional military C2 constructs to the 
cyberspace domain leads to several problems due to the uniqueness of cyberspace 
from the other domains.  In this paper, we describe the factors that make cyberspace 
different from the other operational domains and the challenges those differences 
impose on existing C2 constructs.  The greatest challenge facing the DoD is that it 
does not yet understand how to conduct agile C2 of cyberspace operations, nor does 
it possess strategies to implement agile C2 in the face of the complex dynamics 
presented by this domain.  In 2015, Admiral Mike Rogers, then Commander of US 
Cyber Command, stated, “Our traditional command and control and organizational 
constructs do not enable the speed and agility required to keep pace with change in 
the cyber domain. We must adapt, and soon!”10    We believe that the DoD must 
think about cyberspace in a new way and not be imprisoned by its excellence in the 
physical space which may prevent it from thinking in new ways to meet new 
challenges.11 
Statement of the Problem 
The DoD is currently applying command and control (C2) concepts developed for 
operations in physical space to operations conducted in cyberspace. “Because 
cyberspace is significantly different in both time and space, cyberspace presents a 
much more dynamic and complex operational environment for the U.S. military. 
                                                          
7 Perkins, D. G. & Holmes, J. M. 2018. “Multi-Domain Battle, Converging Concepts Toward a 
Joint Solution”, in  Joint Forces Quarterly, 88, (1st Quarter 2018): 54-57, 55. 
8 Stone, S. 2016. “Factors related to agility in allocating decision-making rights for cyberspace 
operations.” Doctoral dissertation, Robert Morris University. 
9 Kuehl, “From cyberspace to cyberpower: Defining the problem”, 28. 
10 U.S. Department of Defense. 2015.  Beyond the build - Delivering outcomes through 
cyberspace:  The Commanders’ vision and guidance for US Cyber Command.  Fort Meade, MD:  
United States Cyber Command: 2. 
11 Morgan, G. 2006. Images of organization. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
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The temporal and spatial differences presented by cyberspace require the military 
to examine its long-held doctrine for C2 and decision-making.”12 
Purpose of the Paper 
In this paper, we describe the factors that make cyberspace different from the other 
operational domains and the challenges those differences impose on existing C2 
constructs.  We then propose a series of cyberspace C2 experiments to address these 
challenges.  These C2 experiments will conduct research into a taxonomy of C2 
nodes, decisions, information, and relationships, which can be used to simulate and 
refine DoD cyberspace operations C2 constructs. 
Hypothesis and Research Questions 
Key to any research proposal is the statement of the hypothesis and clear research 
questions to be answered.  Our hypothesis for this research is: 
Command and Control of cyberspace operations, supporting multi-domain 
operations, will be most effectively implemented as a hybrid construct of 
coordinated, collaborative, and edge C2 models, within different decision 
spaces, and at different levels of war (national/strategic, operational, and 
technical/tactical). 
Our overarching Research Question is:  
How might the U.S. Department of Defense conduct command and control 
(C2) of cyberspace operations?  
The subordinate research questions are: 
1. How effective are different C2 approaches at different levels of cyberspace 
operations (national/strategic, operational, and tactical/technical)? 
2. How might differing cyberspace operations C2 approaches support multi-
domain operations?  
3. What comparative advantages do different cyberspace operations C2 
approaches provide?  
4. Which cyberspace C2 approaches allow the United States to maintain an 
advantage over our adversaries? 
Methodological Design 
We propose a campaign of experimentation exploring agile C2 of cyberspace 
operations.  This campaign of experimentation is a set of related experimental 
activities that explore and mature knowledge about command and control for 
                                                          
12 Stone, S., Factors related to agility in allocating decision-making rights for cyberspace 
operations, 11. 
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cyberspace operations.13  We propose that this campaign of experimentation 
conduct a series of experiments, using table-top exercises, constructive simulations, 
and live simulations, to assess the potential effectiveness of various C2 approaches 
for cyberspace operations.  We believe that this research will add to the body of 
knowledge in that it will assist the U.S. military in defining the C2 structures and 
procedures that will enable them to be successful in conducting cyberspace 
operations as part of the multi-domain operations of the DoD.  
Summary 
The DoD is struggling to adopt its C2 doctrine, developed for the physical domain, 
to the cyber domain. “The military officers and civilians leading cyberspace 
operations have been influenced by their military education and experience in 
leading military operations in physical space. As such, they are attempting to 
describe how they will conduct cyberspace operations using the concepts and 
doctrine from physical operations.”14 This approach may be flawed because the 
time and space characteristics of cyberspace are significantly different than the 
physical domain. “To be successful, military operations in cyberspace likely require 
new and more agile C2 methods.”15  However, it is not possible to completely 
abandon the existing C2 doctrine as cyberspace operations must be conducted in 
coordination with military operations in the land, sea, air, and space. Unfortunately, 
we believe that the current state of the development of C2 for cyberspace operations 
is based on iterations of trial and error resulting in incremental improvements but 
lacking an objective way to measure effectiveness. Therefore, research into new 
approaches to C2 is necessary to achieve success in cyberspace operations. 
  
                                                          
13 Alberts, D. S., and Hayes, R. E. 2005. Code of Best Practice: Campaigns of Experimentation.  
Washington DC: Office of The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information 
Integration, Command Control Research Program. 
14 Stone, S., Factors related to agility in allocating decision-making rights for cyberspace 
operations, 14. 
15 Ibid. 12. 
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2. Military Command and Control Doctrine:  The Need for Change 
 “The U.S. Department of Defense has a large body of organizational design 
documentation that describes how the U.S. military is organized and functions. In 
military parlance this body of documentation is called doctrine.”16  The U.S. 
military’s term to describe its organizational design and decision-making process 
is command and control (C2). The DoD defines C2 as “The exercise of authority 
and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached 
forces in the accomplishment of the mission.”17  Command is the authority that a 
commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of 
rank or assignment. Command also is defined as  “An order given by a commander; 
that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a 
particular action.”18  Control is defined as “Authority that may be less than full 
command exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or 
other organizations.”19 
The DoD has developed a deliberate decision-making process to aid the 
commander in gathering the information necessary to make a decision, examine 
the alternatives for the decision, and to decide upon the best alternative. This 
process is named the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). The MDMP is 
described as: 
The military decision-making process is an iterative planning methodology 
to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and 
produce an operation plan or order… The military decision-making process 
(MDMP) helps leaders apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, 
and professional knowledge to understand situations, develop options to 
solve problems, and reach decisions. This process helps commanders, 
staffs, and others think critically and creatively while planning.20 
The U.S. military’s C2 doctrine, including decision-making processes, has been 
developed and refined over years of military operations in the industrial age. 
However, there is significant debate as to whether these decision-making processes 
will be effective in the information age. Alberts argues that the traditional DoD C2 
approach is no longer sufficient for military operations in the information age.  The 
current DoD doctrine for operations in the physical domains (land, sea, air, and 
space) has served the U.S. military very well in the past.  However, rapid advances 
                                                          
16 Ibid. 24. 
17 U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, 40. 
18 Ibid. 40. 
19 Ibid. 50. 
20 U.S. Department of the Army. 2012. Army doctrine reference publication (ADRP) 5-0. The 
operations process, (2012).  Retrieved from 
http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adrp5_0.pdf, 2-11. 
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in technology and the ‘leveling’ of access to advanced technology is eroding the 
effectiveness of current C2 doctrine.21   
Recently, the DoD has begun development of new doctrine for Multi-Domain 
Operations.  Multi-Domain Operations doctrine is a response to the realization that 
the environments where the DoD must operate have been changed by advances in 
technologies such as cyberspace, electromagnetic spectrum, robotics, artificial 
intelligence, nanotechnology, biotechnology, three-dimensional printing and 
others.22   These advances have led to the realization that the DoD can no longer 
operate independently in each domain (land, sea, air, space and cyberspace).  There 
is also a realization that the previous doctrine was overly focused on geographic 
boundaries.  Multi-domain operations is a doctrinal concept designed to address the 
changed operational environment.23  Perkins and Holmes state, “We must shift from 
a model of interdependence to one of integration, which includes flexible C2 
designs, better integrated communications systems, and development of tailorable 
and scalable units, and, in key areas, policies that enable adaptability, and 
innovation.”24  
The adversaries of the United States have developed their own doctrine for using 
technology, including cyberspace, and information for military operations.  For 
example, recent Russian operations in Ukraine and Crimea present an example of 
an adversary effectively using cyberspace and information, in tight integration with 
the physical domains, to achieve their operational and strategic objectives.  
Analysis of Russian cyberspace operations in Ukraine point out potential 
weaknesses in the U.S. DoD’s doctrine for cyberspace operations, specifically the 
treatment of cyberspace as another physical domain.   In their 2015 paper, 
Brandishing the Cybered Bear: Information War and the Russia-Ukraine Conflict, 
Unwala and Ghori state, “For the United States, the ‘information war’ concept is 
divided up into different doctrines and policies as if it were another physical domain 
of war.”25  While Russia’s integrated use of cyberspace operations and information 
warfare in tight synchronization with operations in the physical domains 
demonstrated significant success.  “It is possible that this synergistic potential of 
warfare is only realized through Russia’s holistic conceptualization of “information 
war,” rather than the U.S. categorization of cyberspace operations versus 
information operations, military information versus non-military information, and 
offensive capabilities versus defensive capabilities.”26  When applied to the cyber 
domain, the current DoD C2 doctrine is lacking the speed and agility necessary to 
effectively conduct cyberspace operations in support of multi-domain operations.   
                                                          
21 Alberts, D. S.  2007. “Agility, focus, and convergence: The future of command and control.” 
The International C2 Journal 1. No. 1 (2007).  Retrieved from 
http://www.dodccrp.org/html4/journal_main.html. 
22 Perkins, D. G. & Holmes, J. M., “Multi-Domain Battle, Converging Concepts Toward a Joint 
Solution” 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 57. 
25 Unwala, A. & Ghori, S. 2015. "Brandishing the Cybered Bear: Information War and the Russia-
Ukraine Conflict,"  Military Cyber Affairs, (Volume 1, Issue 1, Article 7, 2015), 9.  Available at: 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/mca/vol1/iss1/7 
26 Ibid. 9. 
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Differences in the Cyberspace Domain 
Cyberspace is inherently different than the physical domains.  Alexander 
Klimburng states, “… the tradition of viewing cyber as just another domain 
obfuscates significant differences between cyber and air, land, sea or space.”27  
Cyberspace has a number of significant differences from the physical domains.   
First, cyberspace is a man-made domain. “While the physical characteristics of 
cyberspace come from electromagnetic forces and phenomena that exist and occur 
in the natural world, cyberspace is a human-designed environment, created to use 
and exploit information, human interaction, and intercommunication.”28  Because 
cyberspace is man-made and the hardware, software and data comprising 
cyberspace can change rapidly, cyberspace lacks the “object permanence” of the 
physical domains.29  Kallberg and Cook from the Army Cyber Institute state, “Our 
C2 doctrine does not envision an environment where objects can appear, disappear, 
reappear, and change at computational speed.”30   
Second, the “terrain” of cyberspace is incredibly complicated, comprising millions 
of separate hardware devices, running software with millions of potential settings, 
and processing millions of bits of data.31 The conditions in the cyberspace domain 
are largely determined by software and there are a large number of actors, including 
the private sector,  affecting conditions and changing the ‘terrain’.  
Third, Cyberspace is also global in nature.  Unlike the effect of most weapons in 
the physical domains, effects in cyberspace are not limited to a geographical region.  
This creates an asymmetry between the cyberspace battlefield and the physical 
battlefield that must be taken into account.   
Another difference in cyberspace is that actions can happen extremely rapidly. 
Conflicts can be executed at computational speed and are not bound by time and 
space in the same way that physical effects.   “Cyberspace is significantly different 
in both time and space, cyberspace presents a much more dynamic and complex 
operational environment for the U.S. military.”32  
When compared to the physical domains, the DoD has limited observation  of the 
cyberspace domain.  The vast quantities of data available and the computational 
speed of operations result in a limited ability to see and assess actions in cyberspace, 
resulting in  limited ability to measure the  of effectiveness of operations and a 
limited ability to attribute activity to real world actors resulting in significant 
anonymity in cyberspace.33  
                                                          
27 Klimburg, A. 2018., The Darkening Web: The War for Cyberspace. New York, NY: Penguin 
Books: 138. 
28 Stone, S., Factors related to agility in allocating decision-making rights for cyberspace 
operations: 19. 
29 Kallberg, J. & Cook, T. S. 2017. “Unfitness of Traditional Military Thinking in Cyber”, 
IEEEAccess,Volume 5:  8126-8130. 
30 Ibid, 8127. 
31 Stone, S., Factors related to agility in allocating decision-making rights for cyberspace 
operations. 
32 Ibid. 11. 
33 Kallberg, J. & Cook, T. S., “Unfitness of Traditional Military Thinking in Cyber”. 
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Cyberspace also lacks the commonly accepted behavior norms present in the 
physical domains.  Klimburg states, “… the other domains work under implicit 
rules – both international laws and commonly accepted norms of behavior – that 
constrain not only the most dominant actor but also others.”34 
Also different is the concept of maneuver in cyberspace.  While maneuver in the 
physical domains is routinely understood as either “the movement to place ships, 
aircraft, or land forces in a position of advantage over the enemy.”35 or the 
“employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination 
with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy.”36  this 
understanding likely does not hold in cyberspace.  One might consider the concept 
of ‘maneuvering’ in cyberspace as changing the configuration of a series of 
hardware, software, and data to achieve the desired effect. 
And finally, in the DoD the cyberspace offensive and defensive forces and 
capabilities are more distinct than other domains.  Only in cyberspace has the DoD 
intentionally created separate offensive and defensive forces. 
These difference present significant challenges to the DoD’s C2 doctrine.  Thus, 
the DoD needs to conduct research into future command and control for cyberspace 
operations. 
Theoretical Model of Command and Control 
In order to accurately frame the C2 challenges for cyberspace operations it is 
necessary to identify an appropriate model of the C2 space to assess the problem.  
The review of the literature identified a model of the C2 space developed by the 
Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program. This model, 
developed by Dr. David Alberts and Dr. Richard Hayes, describes three dimensions 
of a theoretical model of C2.  Alberts and Hayes describe three dimensions of a 
theoretical model (see Figure 1) of C2  that are useful to examine the cyber C2 
space: The organization’s allocation of decision-making rights, the organization’s 
patterns of interaction, and the organization’s distribution of information.37 
                                                          
34 Klimburg, A. The Darkening Web: The War for Cyberspace:  138. 
35 U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, 153. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Alberts, D. S., & Hayes, R. E. 2006. Understanding command and control. Washington DC: 
Office of The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, Command 
Control Research Program. 
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 Figure 1. Alberts and Hayes’ Model of Command and Control.38 
This theoretical model of command and control can be visualized as a three-
dimensional matrix, with each factor represented as one axis of a cube.  Alberts 
describes the model as having the allocation of decision rights on the horizontal 
axis, the patterns of organizational interaction on the vertical axis, and the 
distribution of information along the depth axis.  The inside of the cube represents 
the sample of all possible command and control arrangements. Any approach to 
accomplishing command and control of a military operation requires making a 
choice in each of the three related dimensions.  
This model presents a framework for understanding the C2 challenges facing 
cyberspace operations.  Each plane of this model provides an aspect of command, 
control and situational awareness (SA). SA is a critical enabler of C2 and effective 
C2 cannot be conducted in the absence of a sufficient level of SA.  In any operation, 
there are one or more nodes in the C2 structure.  Situational awareness is based on 
the patterns of interaction, who, when, etc. the entity interacts with other nodes, 
and distribution of information, what information is available and understandable 
by the node. A node’s ability to command an operation is based on the patterns of 
interaction and the allocation of decision rights, how much authority, influence, 
and autonomy does the node have?  A node’s ability to control an effect is based 
on the node’s situational awareness and allocation of decision rights. 
                                                          
38 Reprinted from Understanding Command and Control by D.S. Alberts & R. E. Hayes, 2006, p. 
75. Copyright 2006 by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and 
Information Integration, Command Control Research Program. Reprinted with permission. 
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Patterns of Interaction 
Patterns of interaction describe how organizations interact in conducting command 
and control. At the origin of this axis, patterns of interaction are tightly controlled. 
At the opposite end of this axis, organizational interactions are unconstrained.  In 
current DoD operations, the patterns of interaction are largely determined by the 
command and control relationships established in the orders directing the 
operation.  As current military operations usually involve large organizations 
consisting of subordinate organizations distributed in a hierarchical manner, the 
patterns of interaction in a classic C2 structure are designed to ensure control from 
the center. Hence, the pattern of interaction follows the chain of command 
established for the operation.  In C2 of today’s cyberspace operations, these orders, 
with the corresponding C2 relationships, reporting structures, and flow of 
information are not fully optimized.  Using these traditional patterns of interaction 
as defined by current DoD C2 doctrine may not be optimal for C2 of cyberspace 
operations. 
However, in cyberspace operations, patterns of interaction can be considered 
networks.39 The technology underpinning cyberspace makes it possible for all 
entities participating in a military operation to communicate. Effective 
communication enables collaboration, working together toward a common 
purpose, which is the most desirable pattern of interaction.40 Collaboration 
involves actors actively sharing data, information, knowledge, perceptions, or 
concepts when they are working together toward a common outcome and how they 
might achieve that outcome efficiently or effectively.41 Collaboration provides the 
opportunity for the parties to exchange views about the clarity of the data and 
information, as well as what it means or implies, not just to receive information.42 
Distribution of Information 
Information is a strategic asset and it is critical to the conduct of military 
operations. How information is distributed affects the ability of an organization to 
deal effectively with the challenges it faces. The distribution of information can be 
thought of as ranging from fully centralized repositories to a fully distributed 
approach where everyone has access to everything.  At the origin of this axis, 
information is typically stored in a central location and the access of each user was 
predetermined and controlled by a central authority. At the opposite end of the axis, 
advances in communications and information technologies and the accompanying 
changes in the economics of information made it feasible to distribute information 
much more widely and make it accessible to all. 
                                                          
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Alberts, D. S., Garstka, J. J., Hayes, R. E., & Signori, D. A. 2001. Understanding information 
age warfare.  Washington DC:  Assistant Secretary Of Defense, C3I/Command Control Research 
Program. 
42 Alberts & Hayes, Understanding command and control. 
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The Distribution of information axis is significantly affected by the prevalence of  
large amounts of rapidly changing data, commonly called ‘Big Data’.   Big Data 
presents new opportunities to enhance a commander’s understanding of the 
situation, but it is complex to process and interpret this data in order to have true 
Situational Awareness (SA) at all levels of operations  – national/strategic, 
operational, and technical/tactical.  Situational Awareness can be described as 
“…users must understand how their individual actions contribute to a greater 
whole. In other words, they must be aware of the same data and share the same 
legal, social, and cultural context to interpret that data.”43  Interpreting that data 
can be described as sensemaking, “Sensemaking consists of a set of activities or 
processes in the cognitive and social domains that begins on the edge of the 
information domain with the perception of available information and ends prior to 
taking action(s) that are meant to create effects in any or all of the domains.”44   
It is also a challenge to effectively distribute this data.  The prevalence of large 
amounts of data has led to the tendency that everyone wants to see all of the data.  
Distributing data effectively to the right people and organizations who need the 
data in order to make effective decisions is a challenge. 
Allocation of Decision Rights 
The allocation of decision rights is a linear dimension with two logical endpoints. 
At the origin of the allocation of decision rights on the horizontal axis, decision-
making rights are unitary, all the rights held by a single actor. At the other end of 
the axis, decision-making rights are allocated uniformly with every entity having 
equal rights in every decision.  Using current DoD C2 doctrine, decision rights are 
usually established by the C2 relationships directed in the orders authorizing the 
operation.  Command and control relationships such as operational control 
(OPCON), and tactical control (TACON) establish the decision rights that a 
commander may exercise.45 
Decisions are choices among alternatives. The U.S. Department of Defense defines 
a decision as “…a clear and concise statement of the line of action intended to be 
followed by the commander as the one most favorable to the successful 
accomplishment of the assigned mission.”46  Cyber C2 decisions can be broken into 
categories along two dimensions, the level of operations and the decision latency.  
Figure 2 depicts these two dimensions of decision making for cyberspace 
operations.   
On the first dimension, there decisions made at the national/strategic, operational, 
and tactical/technical levels of cyberspace operations, modeling the traditional 
levels of military operations.  At the national/strategic level of cyberspace 
                                                          
43 Pitt, J., Bourazeri, A., Nowak, A., Roszczynska-Kurasinska, M., Rychwalska, A., Rodríguez 
Santiago, I., Lopez Sanchez, M., Florea, M., & Sanduleac. M. 2013. “Transforming big data into 
collective awareness”. Computer 46, no. 6:  40-45. 
44 Alberts, D. S., & Hayes, R. E., Understanding command and control:  64. 
45 U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms: 183 and 242. 
46 Ibid: 62. 
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operations, the decision made are likely answering the question: How do we use 
cyberspace to achieve our National objectives?  At the operational level, the 
relevant question is: How do we use ’cyberspace to achieve the JFC objective(s)?  
And at the technical/tactical level decisions are usually made to answer the 
question:  How do we change the configuration of the hardware, software or data 
to achieve the operational objective?   
The second dimension of decision making is the time available to make the 
decision.  Decisions made at the technical/tactical level are frequently made in 
seconds, minutes or hours.  At the operational level, there are often hours or days 
available to make decisions.  And at the national/strategic level, decision makers 
usually have days or months available to make a decision.  These decisions happen 
across the operations process: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously 
assessing the operation.47 
In determining the allocation of decision rights across the many nodes in a C2 
structure operating across the levels of operations, it is often difficult to balance 
between enabling operational and tactical entities with proper authority while 
maintaining the unity of effort and unity of command necessary to achieve the 
operational and national/strategic objectives.  In most cyberspace operations there 
is significant interdependence between peers at the tactical level requiring higher-
level orchestration, but higher-levels often don’t have the visibility and expertise to 
make timely and effective decisions 
Boyd’s OODA Loop Applied to  Cyberspace Operations 
Another C2 model relevant to cyberspace operations is Boyd’s OODA loop.  Much 
of the current DoD C2 doctrine  is based on the observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) 
loop developed by John Boyd in the 1960s and follows the steps of observe, orient, 
decide, act.48  Executing cyberspace operations can be represented as nested and 
interrelated OODA loops.  Specifically, based on the C2 model implemented, there 
are interrelated OODA loops at every C2 node.  For example, OODA loops at the 
operational level direct and inform OODA loops at the tactical/technical level.  
There are nested OODA loops within each C2 node as the node conducts current 
operations, crisis action planning, near-term planning, and long-term planning. 
 
                                                          
47 U.S. Department of the Army, Army doctrine reference publication (ADRP) 5-0. The operations 
process. 
48 Boyd, J. 1987. Organic Design for Command and Control.  Retrieved from: 
https://www.colonelboyd.com/s/Organic-Design-for-C2_May-1987.pdf. 
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 Figure 2. Levels of Cyberspace Operations Decision-making. 
The OODA loop requires the ability to observe and assess ongoing events , but 
under conditions of anonymity, limited observation, computational speed in cyber 
execution, lack of object permanence, and differences in time and space, the 
observations feeding the loop are likely to be inaccurate.49 
Summary 
Cyberspace presents a complicated operational domain that behaves much 
differently than the physical operational domains, land, sea, air, and space.  Alberts 
and Hayes hypothesize that complex dynamic environments, like cyberspace 
operations, require more agile approaches to C2.  Albert and Hayes’ hypothesis is 
that agile C2 requires the organizational ability to rapidly change their approach 
towards each of the three variables in the theoretical model of C2.50  To address 
these challenges in C2 of cyberspace operations, it is necessary for the DoD to 
conduct research into the taxonomy of C2 nodes, decisions, information, and 
relationships, which can be used to simulate and refine DoD cyberspace operations 
C2 constructs. 
                                                          
49 Kallberg, J. & Cook, T. S., “Unfitness of Traditional Military Thinking in Cyber”. 
50 Alberts & Hayes, Understanding command and control. 
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3. Proposed Experimentation into Future Cyberspace Operations Command and 
Control 
As section 1 describes, to gain insight into C2 within the cyber domain, integrating 
it with C2 within multi-domain operations, and to answer the research questions 
posed, a campaign of experimentation is needed.  This campaign of 
experimentation is a set of related experiments that explore and mature knowledge 
about command and control for cyberspace operations.  It will iteratively gather 
data on the execution of different C2 approaches to evolve our understanding of the 
comparative effectiveness and efficiency of different C2 approaches, within the 
context and limitations of the set of discrete experiments conducted.  This campaign 
does not have a defined end point, but instead is focused on continual learning to 
ultimately improve our understanding of where and when to employ different C2 
models and how to execute within a given C2 construct.   
Each discrete experiment within the campaign has the following components, 
described in additional detail in the following sections: 
• Independent Variable:  A set of C2 models, that consist of nodes, roles, and 
relationships, that will be independently tested within the experiment 
• Dependent Variables:  A set of metrics that measure the effectiveness and 
efficiency of C2 execution and the components of the C2 approach 
• Constant:  A realistic operational scenario, with defined mission objectives, 
injects, and operating environment (including communication delays, error 
rates, and other inherent conditions of cyberspace) that tests each C2 model 
through  the execution of cyberspace operations 
• Experimental Group:  A set of subject matter experts and/or automated 
agents that conduct Cyber C2 within the experiment 
Observations throughout the experiment, leveraging a well-instrumented 
experimental platform, will enable calculating the dependent variable and enable 
intermediary inferences about the relative advantages and disadvantages of the 
tested C2 models.  For an individual experiment, these inferences are limited to the 
specific scenario built into the experiment; the explicit and implicit assumptions 
built into that scenario; the knowledge, skill, and biases built into the experimental 
group; and potentially other unknown biases and measurement error built into the 
experiment.  However, building on individual results over a diverse campaign of 
experimentation, will balance out many of these caveats and allow maturing our 
understanding and increasing our confidence in the conclusions on the application 
of different C2 models in the cyber domain. 
Representative C2 Models  
The theoretical model for command and control, discussed in section 2, represents 
the entire trade space for C2 approaches that can be applied to cyberspace 
operations.  Within that 3-dimensional model a variety of C2 approaches can be 
extracted and modeled for experimentation from a tightly constrained, conflicted 
approach to a highly-collaborative peer-to-per network, and numerous variations in 
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between.  As a starting point for research into Cyber C2, five models that were 
presented in the NATO C2 Agility SAS-085 report are useful.51  These models, 
depicted below in Figure , consist of conflicted, de-conflicted, coordinated, 
collaborative, and edge models.  Over the course of the campaign of 
experimentation, these five models may be blended or adapted into different models 
based on the observations and conclusions made through experimentation.   
 
Figure 3: Preliminary C2 Models52 
The inherent characteristics of these models are  and their potential implications for 
cyberspace operations are described in the sections below. 
  
                                                          
51 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Research and Technology Organization. 2013. Task Group 
SAS-085 Final Report on C2 Agility.  Retrieved from:  http://www.dodccrp.org/sas-085/sas-
085_report_final.pdf. 
52 Ibid.  
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Conflicted C2 
 
Figure 4: Conflicted C253 
The Conflicted C2 model is characterized by multiple independent organizations 
with no collective objective, no distribution of information or interaction between 
organizations, and no coordination of decisions.  In cyberspace operations, this may 
make each organization more autonomous, and thus more agile, but the lack of 
visibility and coordination may also lead to conflicts and inefficient actions across 
peers due to their interdependence within the global domain.54  
  
                                                          
53 Adapted from: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Research and Technology Organization. 
Task Group SAS-085 Final Report on C2 Agility. 
54 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2010. Network Enabled Capability C2 Maturity Model. 
Washington DC:  Assistant Secretary Of Defense, C3I/Command Control Research Program.  
Retrieved from:  http://www.dodccrp.org/files/N2C2M2_web_optimized.pdf. 
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Deconflicted C2 
 
Figure 5: Deconflicted C255 
The Deconflicted C2 model adds a minimal amount of information flow between 
organizations in order to deconflict intents, plans, and actions.  This model can 
enable partitioning of responsibility across the cyberspace domain, functions, 
capabilities, and/or time.  However, the model only consists of limited information 
sharing and interaction, and no overarching authority to align individual teams’ 
objectives.  Thus, there may not be common sensemaking across organizations, 
decision-making is not aligned to joint objectives, and actions may not reflect a 
unity of effort across organizations.56 
  
                                                          
55 Adapted from: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Research and Technology Organization, 
Task Group SAS-085 Final Report on C2 Agility. 
56 Ibid. 
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Coordinated C2 
 
Figure 6: Coordinated C257 
The Coordinated C2 model is characterized by the development of a common intent 
and an agreement to adjust and constrain plans and decisions based on that intent.  
It involves more information sharing, interaction, and additional delegation of 
decision-making rights to the collective.  It falls short of continuous interaction 
between organizations but does incorporate an additional organization to 
deliberately coordinate plans, decisions, and actions.  In cyberspace operations, this 
coordination may improve the synchronization of strategic-level plans and 
objectives down to overlapping tactical/technical actions within the domain.58 
                                                          
57 Adapted from: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Research and Technology Organization, 
Task Group SAS-085 Final Report on C2 Agility. 
58 Ibid. 
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Collaborative C2 
 
Figure 7: Collaborative C259 
The Collaborative C2 model is characterized by the development of a single shared 
plan, defined roles within a larger C2 construct, sharing and pooling of resources, 
and shared sensemaking.  The Collaborative C2 incorporates significant delegation 
of decision-making authorities to the collective, while maintaining distributed 
execution. This model promotes a tight unity of effort, which may be essential to 
maintain alignment of cyberspace operations to broader military objectives, but 
given the complexities of the cyberspace domain, it may also present challenges for 
effective and efficient execution.  These challenges may include developing high-
quality SA across a broad cyberspace operations mission, accurate and actionable 
decision making, and coordinating the tactical/technical implications of those 
decisions. 60 
                                                          
59 Adapted from: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Research and Technology Organization, 
Task Group SAS-085 Final Report on C2 Agility. 
60 Ibid. 
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Edge C2 
 
Figure 8: Edge C261 
“An Edge approach to C2 distinguishes itself from the other C2 approaches by 
replacing deliberate and formal coordination and collaboration mechanisms with 
the dynamics of emergence and self-synchronization.”62 .  The self-synchronization 
enables a subset of organizations to employ other C2 models for limited time or 
purpose, while retaining broader authorities and decision-making rights.  In 
cyberspace operations, a completely distributed C2 model, such as this edge 
approach, should promote improved situational understanding and sensemaking, 
but the distributed construct may also inhibit the development of a shared plan or 
unity of effort through execution.  The effectiveness in this model is highly 
dependent on the details of its implementation and the capabilities that enable it – 
how is consensus on plans and decisions developed and orchestrated across 
organizations?  An edge model has potential for more direct and effective 
information sharing, interactions, and delegation of decision-making rights, but it 
remains that evidence of that potential still needs to be collected and analyzed.63 
Dependent Variables 
To gain insight into Cyber C2 and measure the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
C2 approaches described above, experiments must be constructed to measure the 
ability for the C2 model to produce overall mission effectiveness.  In addition, the 
                                                          
61 Adapted from: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Research and Technology Organization, 
Task Group SAS-085 Final Report on C2 Agility. 
62 Alberts, D. S., & Hayes, R. E. 2003. Power to the edge: Command... control... in the 
information age. Washington DC: Office of The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and 
Information Integration, Command Control Research Program. 
63 Ibid. 
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experiment must also measure the quality of the components of the C2 approach, 
to include quality of command, quality of control, quality of sensemaking, quality 
of execution, and information quality.  The below model, from Understanding 
Command and Control, depicts these 6 measures of the proposed experiments. 
 
Figure 9: C2 Approach64 
These six measures must be further decomposed into discrete metrics that can be 
built into an experiment.  The following table delineates a preliminary set of metrics 
that can be used in comparative analysis of the C2 models.  
  
                                                          
64 Alberts & Hayes, Understanding command and control. 
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 C2 Measure Description Metric 
Mission 
Effectiveness 
The overall measure of 
C2 model effectiveness in 
a scenario 
• # Mission tasks 
completed 
• # Mission Objectives 
achieved 
 
Quality of 
Command 
Can Decisions be made?   • Time to converge on a 
decision 
• # conflicted decisions 
 
Quality of Control Can decisions be 
executed? 
• % Decisions Executed 
• Time to execute 
decisions 
Quality of sense-
making 
Do nodes arrive at 
good/similar SU? 
 
• % of nodes with 
understanding matching 
reality 
• % of nodes with same 
understanding 
Quality of 
execution 
Are actions taken 
effective given reality and 
performed with unity of 
effort? 
• # conflicted actions 
• # coordinated actions 
 
Information quality Can information be 
collected and distributed 
efficiently? 
 
• Distribution of 
information - % of nodes 
receiving information 
element 
• % of information 
accuracy 
Table 1: Metrics Collected during Experiment 
Experimental Scenarios 
The challenge with C2 experimentation within cyberspace is to construct individual 
experiments that are highly relevant to real-world situations and challenges.  There 
are many considerations and compromises to make.  The following characteristics 
will inform scenario development:  
• Relevant to current challenges in cyberspace operations 
• Abstract, modifiable, and extensible such that it be fully modeled and reused 
over multiple rounds of experimentation 
• Simple enough so that it can be developed and conducted in reasonable time 
• Difficult enough that it is not trivial to accomplish regardless of C2 model 
used  
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• Comprehensive in its range of difficulties, so that the characteristics of the 
cyberspace domain are relevant and the effects of changes in C2 model are 
observed65 
Revisiting the differences in the cyberspace domain from section 2, in each scenario 
crafted for experimentation, certain assumptions need be made about the domain 
conditions, its actors, and their capabilities.  To ensure an experiment is targeting 
the challenges that emerge in conducting C2 of cyberspace operations that hinder 
traditional C2 approaches, those differences must be influential within the scenario 
under experiment. For example,  the following questions can inform scenario 
development around a few of the differences identified: 
• Will objects in the domain disappear, be created, or be reconfigured and 
with what speed and frequency?  (Man-made domain) 
• What level of visibility, and what level of accuracy, will participants have 
within the domain and how will that change over time? (“Terrain” is 
incredibly complicated, Activities can happen extremely rapidly) 
• How much overlap in responsibilities exists across different C2 nodes’ Area 
of Operation? (Cyberspace is an interdependent, global domain) 
Additionally, the scenarios must account for decision making at the strategic, 
operational and tactical/technical levels along with execution at the local, regional, 
and global levels (e.g., the decision to make a global configuration change is 
tactical/technical in nature despite being a global action). Since geography largely 
aligns with command and control in the physical domain (Global/Strategic, 
Regional/Operational, and Local/Tactical), and cyberspace operations must 
integrate C2 into multi-domain operations, the scenarios must also explore the 
variations in the levels of decision making in cyberspace operations, and how it 
integrates with multi-domain C2. 
Finally, the scenarios must account the variation of national/military objectives and 
effects achieved both in and through cyberspace and how effective a C2 model is 
in achieving different types of objectives (and countering an adversary’s 
objectives).  Effects achieved in cyberspace include IT service disruptions and 
degradations or loss of data confidentiality, availability and integrity.  Effects 
through cyberspace can include kinetic effects that disrupt or destroy physical 
systems and/or cause human injury or loss of life.  It also includes cognitive effects, 
including exploiting individual or groups’ cognitive vulnerabilities - a premise that 
the audience is already predisposed to accept because it appeals to existing fears or 
anxieties.66  A C2 model may be effective at maintaining IT service levels, but 
                                                          
65 Ruddy, M. 2007. “ELICIT --The Experimental Laboratory for Investigating Collaboration, 
Information-sharing and Trust.” In Proceedings 12th International Command and Control 
Research and Technology Symposium, Newport, RI.  Retrieved from:  
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/31228/ICCRTS07_Ruddy.pdf?sequence=
1. 
66 Waltzman, R. 2017. The Weaponization of Information, The Need for Cognitive Security. 
Washington, DC. The RAND Corporation.  Retrieved from: 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT473.html. 
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could lack the ability to counter an Information Operation targeting a Force’s 
cognitive vulnerability.   
Following are three experimental scenarios that seek to address the challenges with 
realistically modeling the environment and account for uniqueness in the 
cyberspace domain.  These scenarios act as a starting point for experimentation, but 
must be enhanced and broadened as experimentation matures, lessons are learned, 
and new research questions and hypothesis are presented.   
1. Supporting a local commander with mission critical services from an 
external service provider – The Cyber domain is inherently global – and 
shared – forcing commanders to rely on external service providers, possibly 
with different priorities and situational understanding, to provide services 
critical to mission success.  Managing competing priorities by commanders 
across an organization as large as the DoD is challenging.  The scenario will 
inject a directed cyber-attack by an adversary the commander is engaged 
with in a multi-domain battle.  Relaying the urgency, pertinent information, 
and sharing threat intelligence with the external service provider will be 
critical to defining the mission critical service for the commander. 
2. Coordinating offensive and defensive forces in the cyber domain against an 
adversary – Cyber is the unique in that offensive and defensive forces are 
distinct, creating another layer of needed coordination when engaging with 
an adversary.  An offensive attack to support military objectives may be met 
with a response from the adversary, requiring defensive forces to be aware 
of offensive actions that can cause blowback.  The defensive forces will 
need access to intelligence to improve their readiness.  Similarly, internal 
defensive actions can be supplemented with offensive actions intended to 
disrupt or deny the adversary actions, or to provide a deterrence against 
future actions.  The scenario will test the collaboration and unity of effort 
between offensive and defensive forces given different C2 constructs. 
3. Defending against persistent adversaries with methods that impose a cost to 
the adversary that is more than they gain from an attack – Traditional 
defensive actions attempt to detect adversaries, attempt to remove them 
from compromised networks, and harden defensives to prevent them from 
returning.  These actions are easy for persistent adversaries to evade in 
future attacks through small modifications in their techniques and tools.  
This makes defense much more expensive than offense in the cyber domain, 
putting less aggressive organizations at a disadvantage.  Further, it 
disincentivizes the adoption of cyber norms during peacetime.  Tipping the 
equation so that defensive forces can inflict more cost on persistent 
adversaries requires more intelligence, more coordination of response 
actions, and more consideration of multi-domain or whole-of-government 
responses.  This scenario will test whether C2 constructs can effectively 
collaborate on adversary actions and effectively coordinate more complex 
responses than the detect, mitigate, and recover actions that are typically 
employed. 
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Research Design 
The research will be conducted through a series of online experiments to compare 
the relative efficiency and effectiveness of command and control (C2) 
organizational structure within the cyber domain in performing tasks that require 
decision making and collaboration.  The experiments will be based on scenarios 
that inject the unique challenges within the cyber domain discussed in section 2.  It 
will include subject matter experts and/or simulated roles interacting through a 
messaging interface to share situational awareness, collaborate and coordinate 
decisions and actions, provide directions to subordinate organizations, and to 
confirm task completion.  Based on the C2 models discussed, the experiment will 
measure mission effectiveness and the components of C2 contributing to it – quality 
of command, quality of control, quality of sense-making, quality of execution, and 
information quality.   
Data Collection and Analysis 
Through the experiment, messages between nodes in the C2 model will be collected 
to measure timing, accuracy, and state of activity (e.g., task completion, decision 
made).  This data will be aggregated and processed to provide a quantitative result 
of the metrics implemented in the experiment for each of the six measures of a C2 
model, described at the beginning of section 3.  Across multiple runs of the 
experiment, including runs of each C2 model under test, it will be possible to rank 
order the C2 models for each measure (e.g., quality of command, quality of control) 
as well as the C2 models’ overall ability to produce mission effectiveness. 
The results of these experiments will be heavily influenced by the assumptions built 
into the model, variations in participant actions, and limitations of the experimental 
scenarios and operational environment implement.  Given the complexities of the 
experiment and the cyber domain, the methodology should not be expected to 
predict results that would occur in a real scenario but should indicate potential 
advantages and disadvantages of employing different C2 constructs  in the cyber 
domain and areas for continued experimentation.   
Validity and Reliability 
The complexity of the cyberspace operations and limitations in modeling real world 
scenarios, the validity and reliability of the conclusion from any single experiment 
must be treated with low confidence.  Through iterations over a campaign of 
experimentation, and feedback from real world operations, additional data will 
refine the results; help to evolve experimental techniques, scenarios, and 
environment; and inform the formulation and refinement of research questions and 
hypothesis.  
Summary 
The DoD may be able to improve C2 of cyberspace operations by expanding C2 
concepts developed for the physical domains and embark on a campaign of 
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experimentation to understand, evaluate, and ultimately employ new C2 models 
from the broader C2 trade space.  In this paper, we described the factors that make 
cyberspace different from the other operational domains and the challenges those 
differences impose on existing C2 constructs.  We then proposed a series 
Cyberspace C2 experiments to address these challenges, leveraging extensive work 
by the DoD Command and Control Research Program and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization.  These experiments will be constructed to test and refine our 
hypothesis: 
Command and Control of Cyberspace Operations, supporting Multi-
Domain Operations, will be most effectively implemented as a hybrid of 
coordinated, collaborative, and edge C2 models, within different decision 
spaces. 
From this, we believe actionable results will inform how the U.S. Department of 
Defense conducts Command and Control (C2) of Cyberspace Operations. 
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